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ABSTRACT The authors seek to explain the desire for community return by displaced persons in
Bosnia. They find a key difference between the minorities displaced from the urban and rural
parts of Bosnia. While the rural displaced tend to value community returns, the urban displaced
are unlikely to do so; hence the generally low success rate of urban returns in post-war Bosnia.
Family dynamics seems to influence community returns, as the decision to return often seems to
be made by families, not isolated individuals. Finally, less nationalistic displaced persons seem
more interested in return into a minority situation than more nationalistic ones.
Introduction
The Bosnian civil war of the early to mid-1990s left a great number of individuals and
families displaced either as refugees in third countries or internally displaced within
their own country. In this article, we seek to understand the desire for a community
return process that brings displaced persons back to their original homes alongside
former neighbours, using Bosnia as a case study. The analysis is broken into six sections.
We start with a detailed overview of the political context of the return process in post-war
Bosnia. We then lay out our five major hypotheses and suggest their possible impact on the
desire for a communal return; the home hypothesis, the security hypothesis, the national-
ism hypothesis, the social capital hypothesis and the socio-economic hypothesis. Next, we
describe the data and methods, specifically our use of a survey conducted in Bosnia during
the summer of 2013. We analyse a representative sample of Bosnians and compare retur-
nees to their pre-war place of origin with forced migrants who are still displaced within
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In our findings section, we breakdown the characteristics of returnees by period of
return and create regression models for both returnees and those who are still displaced
to predict what factors would lead someone to desire community return. We test each
of the hypotheses in turn. In our discussion section, we examine the results more
thoroughly and point to common threads of higher preference for community return in
rural areas and among the less nationalistic as well as the significance of family dynamics
in the return process. We conclude with a brief discussion of the significance and limit-
ations of our findings and their implications going forward for Bosnia-Herzegovina and
other areas experiencing large scale displacement.
The Context of Bosnian Returns
Bosnia is a critical case for refugee and forced migration studies, not only for the intensity
and variation in conflict experience among displaced persons, but also for the policies
employed following the 1995 Dayton Peace Accord to facilitate peaceful voluntary
return. The civil war of 1993–1995 left about 2.2 million displaced out of the pre-war
population of 4.37 in a war equated in the international media with ethnic cleansing.1
Even though the Dayton Peace Accord stipulated the federalization of Bosnia across
ethnic lines, it also protected the right of return for displaced persons and assigned its
implementation to international agencies, hoping to enable minorities to return to their
former homes (Bieber, 2006; Black, 2001).2 Dayton allowed for the return of the displaced
not only within their ethnic units as ‘majority returnees’ (i.e. in areas dominated by their
own communities) but also as ‘minority returnees’ who could claim their homes, proper-
ties, residency and voting rights in areas designated in Dayton to another ethnic commu-
nity.3 Breaking way from the irreversibility of ethnic cleansing in its broader region,
post-conflict Bosnia saw about 1,015,394 of those exiled returning to the country by
2006 including 457,194 returning under minority4 status in areas administered by
another ethnic group (Belloni, 2001).5
The implementation of the Accord was not straightforward, however. It was slowly
applied through a process of trial and error, and early attempts to ensure the safety of min-
ority returnees and the return of their property met with strong resistance from nationalist
political authorities and extremist groups (Sert, 2008, p. 106). Even so, by March 2005,
92% of the property restitution claims were resolved (Sert, 2008, p. 97) allowing the res-
toration of some pre-war communities through organized community return, with only few
individual returns in others. As demonstrated elsewhere in the literature on return, Bosnia
has been a partial success story: some areas have had experienced few ‘individual returns’,
that is, handful of individuals returning and unable to re-establish their pre-war commu-
nities and institutions. Other areas experienced ‘group return’, with large groups of orga-
nized returnees able to recreate their major educational, political and social institutions
(Belloni, 2001; Bieber, 2006; Black, 2001).
In this article, we go a step further. We take a closer look at the key features of the
Bosnian return experience, focusing on the differences between the minorities displaced
from the urban and rural parts of the country, the significance of family dynamics for suc-
cessful community returns and the role of nationalist ideology in preventing displaced
persons from returning as minority returnees. We find that the Bosnian return process,
despite its partial successes and limitations, is one of the first relatively successful attempts
to reverse ethnic cleansing in the contemporary history of the Balkans and the Middle East.
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Clearly, the Bosnian return experience has had some major difficulties. In the early
years, the international community’s efforts were scattered and sometimes conflictual
(Toal & Dahlman, 2011, p. 146). In this period, majority returns were possible but min-
ority returns were rare and often dangerous. But with a change in the control of returns
to a centralized international force, the security and legal situation of minority returnees
improved, numbers increased and returns peaked in 2000–2003 (Bieber, 2006, p. 112),
with 306,485 of the total 434,206 minority returnees arriving home (Toal & Dahlman,
2011, p. 262). After the peak years, minority returns again slowed, possibly due to
Bosnia’s weak economy and/or ethnic discrimination in the job market.
In terms of ethnic differences in returns, Bosniac internally displaced persons (IDPs)
were more likely to return than their Serb or Croat counterparts. The ethnic differences
in the return rates are usually understood as a reflection of the post-war politics in the
three Bosnian constitutive nations. On the one hand, Serb and Croat nationalists had gen-
erally focused on ‘right-peopling’ their ethno-territorial regions, that is, on replacing the
ethnically cleansed Others with IDPs from their respective ethnic groups. Accordingly,
Serb and Croat IDPs were pressured by ‘their’ nationalists to stay on ‘their’ territories,
with return represented as ‘unpatriotic’ and strongly discouraged (Toal & Dahlman,
2011, pp. 169, 185). On the other hand, Bosniac nationalists used return to re-capture ter-
ritories lost during the war (Toal & Dahlman, 2011, pp. 167–176). One Bosniac mayor
explained a successful case of mass Bosniac return as ‘we have retaken that territory
with our people’ (Toal & Dahlman, 2011, p. 176). Physical returns (as opposed to just
property return or exchange) had an impact on votes for the local nationalist parties,
making them a threat or boon to local political control (Sert, 2011, p. 222). For nationalists
on all sides, the freedom of IDPs to decide for themselves where they wanted to live was
less important than victories in local elections and control over territory.
While the property restitution policy in Bosnia was a major success, the return of prop-
erty generally did not lead to the return of people, as many forced migrants exchanged or
sold their property. Sert (2011, p. 223) says this may partly explain how nationalist resist-
ance to property return was broken down, as restoring property facilitated leaving the area
by providing capital to move elsewhere. Fieldwork by the Union of Associations for Refu-
gees, Displaced Persons, and Returnees in Bosnia [UARDPRB] (2007, p. 1), indicates that
only about one third of all minority forced migrants actually returned to their pre-war
homes. In several cases, forced migrants used the reconstructed housing property as a
summer home, spending most of the year at the place of wartime exile (UARDPRB,
2010, p. 16). Even in the townships where community effort led to successful mass
return, the return was often not followed by well-designed and funded local economic
development programmes. While many Bosnians suffered from very high unemploy-
ment—around 40% in the early 2000s—the minority returnees also faced ethnic discrimi-
nation, especially in terms of employment in local public institutions (Jansen, 2006,
p. 189; UARDPRB, 2008, pp. 7, 17). Consequently, after the mass return, many returnees
left again, this time for economic reasons—to find jobs.
Furthermore, even under the best of conditions, some groups of forced migrants might
not be interested in return. There may be gender and age differences, for example, with
elderly men more likely to return and young women being less likely to return (Stefanovic
& Loizides, 2015). As Jansen (2008, p. 55) observes in his ethnography of returns in
Bosnia, elderly refugees are ‘dying to return and returning to die’. Refugees too young
to remember much of the pre-displacement life are generally less committed to return,
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and the generation born after the forced migration may not even associate ‘home’ with the
pre-displacement region. The gender difference might be related to greater opportunities
for women in urban Bosnia (or Western countries of exile) compared to small town or rural
Bosnia. Furthermore, public opinion polls indicate very high desire among the Bosnian
youth—not only the internally displaced—to leave Bosnia. Finally, while there were
several areas with very high return levels in Bosnia, the available data suggest these
areas are generally small, mono-ethnic townships or villages (UNDP and Oxford Research
International, 2007, p. 20; UARDPRB, 2010, p. 17). Bosnia’s urban areas were once
famous centres of multiethnic life, but post-war urban minority returns have been
limited. Bosnia’s cities are now overwhelmingly mono-ethnic.
Several studies indicate that the decision to return often emerges not from an individ-
ual’s personal choice, but from negotiations among family members and neighbours
(Black et al., 2004, p. v). A survey of Columbian IDPs finds people active in local
peasant organizations are more likely to desire to return to their pre-conflict homes (Dei-
ninger, Ibanez, & Querubin, 2004, p. 17). Glatzer observes in his study of the late 1980s
Afghani returns, ‘Because in Kunar there are too few people it is unsafe, because it is
unsafe, more people don’t come. This circle cannot be broken by individual decisions
to go back, but only by organized mass return’ (Glazer, 1990, cited in Harpviken, 2014,
p. 66). Similarly, the president of the local returnee organization in the Gorazde region
of Bosnia remarks, ‘Together the returnees endured most of the hardships and were
safer when physical attacks on us still happened and the security situation was poor’
(Porobic & Mameledzija, 2014, p. 24). In Zvornik region, mutual support helped
Bosniac returnees deal with discrimination, unemployment and poverty (Porobic &
Mameledzija, 2014, p. 12). However, none of these studies try to explain why the
desire for the community return varies among returnees and the still displaced.
Hypotheses
The existing studies contain many useful suggestions on how to measure the degree to
which a displaced individual desires community return and the degree to which commu-
nity return matters to an individual who has already returned, our present goals. Accord-
ingly, we draw on these studies. In addition, we examine the difference among the
returnees across three main periods of return. Ultimately, we formulate and test five
hypotheses.
The home hypothesis ties directly into why a person would want to return to the scene of
his/her violent expulsion. While the definition and level of importance of ‘home’ is
debated (Bolognani, 2007, pp. 60, 65; Ghanem, 2003, pp. 3, 16; Hammond, 2004,
p. 37; Jansen, 2006, p. 185, 2008, p. 44; Stefansson, 2004b, p. 54), returning to a place
of comfort drives some returnees. Whether to reclaim lost property, regain old relation-
ships or to feel returned to their spiritual ‘roots’ (Stefansson 2004a, pp. 2–3), displaced
Bosnians have shown a willingness to take on the hardship of return to their old commu-
nity. Group return is expected to be preferred by those who wish to feel that sense of com-
munity. However, we expect there is a difference between urban and rural returns. While
the rural returnees to mono-ethnic villages might be able to recreate a pre-conflict local
community (assuming enough people return), a sense of community in (once) multicul-
tural cities cannot be recreated by (mono-ethnic) community returns. Moreover, while
community return can bring safety in numbers in rural areas, in the urban areas it might
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make the minority community more visible and, thus, more vulnerable to ethnic harass-
ment or worse.
One of the major problems of return is expressed by the security hypothesis. This
hypothesis considers both perceived risk factors and risk tolerance of security issues in
determining how likely possible returnees are to prefer group return. As it examines per-
ceived risk, not actual risk, those surveyed may underestimate or overestimate their poten-
tial risk based on communications with other returnees, media stories, personal risk
assessment, the ability to ward off threats and/or an overwhelming (or underwhelming)
desire to return. We expect group return will be preferred by those who feel more vulner-
able and seek safety in numbers. A study of Iraqi forced migrants indicates women are less
likely to want to return to areas with high rates of sexual violence and violations of
women’s rights in general (Sassoon, 2011, p. 158). If this hypothesis is correct, people
with a higher sense of physical vulnerability, such as women and the elderly, will be
more likely to desire community return than young men.
The nationalism hypothesis predicts hard core nationalists will strongly desire to return
to their native area (Dahlman & Tuathail, 2005, pp. 648, 656; Jansen, 2008, p. 45). Nation-
alists are expected to prefer group return as way to reclaim the territory their ethnic group
lost due to ethnic cleansing.
The fourth hypothesis argues social capital encourages the return process, including the dis-
semination of information and the provision of the resources needed to travel back or to facili-
tate group return (Brown, 2002, pp. 8–10; Lin, 2000, p. 792; Walsh, Black, & Koser, 1999,
pp. 114–115). Those who have more trust in their family members and neighbours may be
more willing to work with them to return together. Conversely, those having poor relations
with their families and neighbours may not see them as potential resources in a return process.
Finally, the socio-economic hypothesis expects those who have money will not need to
rely on others to facilitate their return. If this hypothesis is correct, we should find a lower
preference for group return among those with higher income and better education
(measured as highest self-reported education level attained).
Data and Methods
The data were collected in a survey conducted in Bosnia in June and July 2013.6 The
survey agency used a four-stage stratified sample: in the first stage, it selected municipa-
lities using simple random sampling;7 in the second stage, it selected a polling station pro-
portional to its size within selected municipalities; in the third stage, it selected households
using random route technique selection from a given address; finally in the fourth stage, it
selected individuals within the household to be interviewed using a Kish Table. If respon-
dents consented to be interviewed, the field interviewers conducted face-to-face interviews
in the homes of the participants. The senior staff of the survey agency conducted the
day-to-day monitoring of the data collection process and provided daily updates to the
Principal Investigator. The response rate was 63.53%, with a total of 1,007 interviews
completed. After data collection, the results were entered into an SPSS file, and original
copies of the questionnaires were destroyed. An IPSOS survey statistician calculated
weights based on inclusion probabilities and the demographic data available. As Bochsler
and Schläpfer (2016, p. 467) note, surveys on ethnicity in post-war Bosnia or other post-
conflict societies can be used as a political tool to consolidate ethnic identity, rather than
merely represent it. In our study, the focus on the three main ethnic groups of Bosniac,
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Croatian and Serbian seems valid given the low representation in our dataset for people
who do not self-identity in one of the major groups. For the operationalization of the vari-
ables used, see Table A1 in the Appendix.
Out of the 1,007 respondents in the sample, 205 are minority still displaced; 300 are
minority returnees; 246 are majority (returnees and still displaced); and 256 are never dis-
placed. Our data analysis focuses on minority returnees (Figure 1, Tables 1 and 2) and
minority still displaced (Table 3). In the multivariate analysis (Tables 2 and 3) the
number of missing cases for the predictor variables leads to a reduction in the number
of cases under analysis, from 293 to 212 and from 189 to 138, for minority returnees
and minority still displaced, respectively.
Multivariate analysis of the predictors of the preference for community returns proceeds
in two steps. We first look at the predictors of the preference among the returnees (Table 2)
and then among the still displaced (Table 3). In both cases, we produce three nested
models: first model includes just the structural variables; the second model adds the
experience variables; and the third model adds the attitudinal variables. The predictor vari-
ables are the same for both returnees and still displaced, with the exception of fear of lone-
liness, which was only available for the still displaced. Building nested models in this
manner, combined with additional data analysis, allows us to identify and analyse some
forms of causal complexity, such as the possibility that an attitudinal predictor might be
influenced by structural predictors.8
Findings
We started by comparing characteristics of minority returnees over time. As seen in Figure
1, the sample data collected among current returnees support the general perception that
minority returns peaked in the 2000–2002 period. More specifically, of minority returnees
in our sample, about one third (31.94%) returned before 2000; about half (48.61%)
returned from 2000 to 2002; and about one fifth (19.44%) returned from 2003 to 2012.
Figure 1. Returns over time. Source: 2013 Bosnian returns survey.
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Table 1 compares the characteristics of minority returnees across the three return
periods. We see that across all three periods, minority returnees tend to be elderly
people from rural areas. As expected, Bosniacs are the majority in all periods. Later retur-
nees in the sample are likely to be women, to be less educated, to have experienced close
loss during the war, and to report lower family incomes. However, gender differences
between the periods are not statistically significant. Statistically significant differences
over periods are in average family income (between the first and second periods only),
educational levels (between the first and third periods only) and experience of close
loss. In addition, minority returnees in the second period are more likely to have strong
memories of the pre-war life than minority returnees in the first period; the average
Table 1. Characteristics of minority returnees by period of return
Before 2000 2000–2002 2003–2012
Median age 59 years 61 years 60.5 years
Gender composition Male: 54% Male: 50% Male: 44%
Female: 46% Female: 50% Female: 56%
Ethnic composition Bosniacs: 58% Bosniacs: 65% Bosniacs: 70%
Croats: 5% Croats: 9% Croats: 3%
Serbs: 36% Serbs: 24% Serbs: 23%
Other: 0% Other: 1% Other: 3%
Pre-war origin Non-Urban: 97% Non-urban: 97% Non-urban: 95%













Wartime loss of a close person 36%∗ 47%∗ 61%∗
Wartime abuse 18% 14% 13%
At least one interethnic friend 43% 40% 37%
Membership in the DPA 5% 9% 8%
Mean family income 504 KM∗∗ 377 KM∗∗ 383 KM
Wartime Exile in Bosnia 72% 79% 81%
Strong memories of pre-war life 69%† 80%† 77%
Open to intermarriagea 2.929 2.924 2.719
Post-war family trust compared
to pre-war
More: 36% More: 38% More: 34%
Same: 55% Same: 55% Same: 63%
Less: 9% Less: 7% Less: 3%
Post-war trust for co-ethnics
compared to pre-war
More: 16% More: 19% More: 19%
Same: 57% Same: 55% Same: 52%




N 92 140 68
Notes:
aPlease see Appendix for details on survey questions and variable coding.
bKM ¼ Convertible Mark (konvertibilna marka), approximately 53 cents (0.53) USD in January 2017.
Significance: †p,.10, ∗p,.05, ∗∗p,.01, ∗∗∗p,.001.
Source: 2013 Bosnian Returns Survey.
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Table 2. Regression of preference for community return among returnees on predictors







































































Memories of pre-war life 2.289
(.392)
Open to intermarriage .374∗
(.176)
Post-war family trust .802†
(.439)








Adjusted R2 1.8% 4.1% 12%
Number of Respondents 293 215 212
Notes:
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Reference category for Settlement is Rural.
For the exact wording of questions and coding of variables, see Table A1 in the Appendix.
Adjusted R2 indicates the model fit, or the percentage of the variability of the dependent variables correctly
predicted by the model. It varies from 0% (no fit at all) to 100% (perfect fit).
Fear of loneliness was not measured for the returnees.
Significance: †p,.10, ∗p,.05, ∗∗p,.01, ∗∗∗p,.001.
Source: Bosnia Survey June–July 2013.
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Table 3. Regression of preference for community return among still displaced on predictors







































































Memories of pre-war life 2.272
(.377)
Open to intermarriage .544∗∗
(.199)
Post-war Family Trust 2.877∗
(.438)
Post-war Trust of people of the same ethnicity 2.272
(.338)








Adjusted R2 12.4% 14% 43%
Number of respondents 189 141 138
Notes:
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Reference category for Settlement is Rural.
For the exact wording of questions and coding of variables, see Table A1 in the Appendix.
Adjusted R2 indicates the model fit, which is the percentage of the variability of the dependent variables correctly
predicted by the model. It varies from 0% (no fit at all) to 100% (perfect fit).
Significance: †p,.10, ∗p,.05, ∗∗p,.01, ∗∗∗p,.001.
Source: Bosnia Survey June–July 2013.
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importance of community returns is smaller for the returnees in the third period than in the
second; and these differences are statistically significant.
The change over time shown in Table 1 suggests a possible decline in the dangers the
more vulnerable groups (the victimized and the poor) felt they would face in a return to
Bosnia, implying some success in the improvement of security. In addition, the average
significance of community return for an individual’s decision to return seems to decline
over time, again suggesting later returnees felt less vulnerable and thus had less need
for the greater safety of community return.
Table 2 shows the factors that influence the desire for the community return—that is, the
importance of community return to an individual’s decision to return—among the actual
returnees. Model 1 indicates that age, gender and education are not significant predictors.
However, urban returnees are less likely to value community return than rural returnees,
net of other factors and this finding is statistically significant. Some ethnic differences are
statistically significant as well, with ethnic Croats more likely to value community return
than Bosniacs. Overall, the model fit is extremely poor. Model 1 offers some support for
the home hypothesis but no other.
Model 2 shows the impact of experience variables. Wartime close loss, wartime abuse and
membership in a DPA are not statistically significant predictors. Contrary to the nationalism
hypothesis, interethnic friendships are positively associated with the desire for community
return. Contrary to the socio-economic resources hypothesis, family income is positively
associated with the desire for community return. In terms of ethnicity, Bosniacs are more
likely to value community return than ethnic Others.9 As in Model 1, urban pre-war origin
is a statistically significant negative predictor of the desire for community return. These find-
ings give some modest support for the home hypothesis only, with a model fit of 4.1%.
Finally, Model 3 introduces attitudinal variables. Contrary to the nationalism hypothesis,
interethnic friendships and openness to intermarriage increase the desire for community
return. However, in line with the nationalism hypothesis, those with a high level of trust in
members of their own ethnic groups are more likely to value community return. As in
Model 2, contrary to the socio-economic resources hypothesis, as family income goes up,
so too does the appreciation for community return. However, as post-war family trust goes
up, so does the appreciation for community return; this is exactly the opposite of what we
see in Table 3. This finding lends some support to the social capital hypothesis. Finally,
the percent of variability explained is now 12%, indicating an improvement in the model fit.
Overall, findings in Table 2 give some support for the home hypothesis and social capital
hypothesis. We find very little support for the nationalism hypothesis and no support at all
for the security hypothesis or the socio-economic resources hypothesis. In opposition to the
nationalism hypothesis, more nationalistic respondents seem less likely to desire community
return. We also find the more nationalistic forced migrants are less likely to return than the
more tolerant ones. In other words, nationalism matters, but its effects seem to be exactly the
opposite of those assumed by the nationalism hypothesis.
We next look at predictors of the preference for community return among minority
forced migrants who are still displaced (i.e. have not returned to the pre-war residence).
We design three models: the first contains structural variables only; the second adds experi-
ence variables; and the third adds attitudinal variables. As Table 3 shows, in Model 1, age,
gender, education and ethnicity are not statistically significant predictors of the preference
for community return among the still internally displaced Bosnians, net of other indicators
in the model. In line with the home hypothesis, the displaced from urban areas are less likely
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to want a community return than the displaced from the rural areas, and these differences are
statistically significant. Adjusted R2 value of 12.4% indicates a weak model fit. Overall,
Model 1 modestly supports the home hypothesis.
Model 2 shows the effect of the introduction of variables associated with wartime or
post-war experiences. Surprisingly, wartime close loss and wartime abuse are not statisti-
cally significant predictors of the preference for community return, net of other variables in
the model. Moreover, location of the wartime exile (i.e. within Bosnia or abroad) is not a
statistically significant predictor of the desire for community return, nor are interethnic
friendships or family income. The only experience variable that seems to matter is mem-
bership in a displaced persons’ association (DPA); such persons are statistically signifi-
cantly more likely to desire community return, net of other variables in the model.
Urban pre-war origin remains a statistically significant predictor.
Interestingly, once we control for DPA membership, the contrast between ethnic Serbs
and ethnic Bosniacs becomes statistically significant. Additional analysis shows there are
Serbs who are DPA members, who would like to return as a community and who did not
manage to return. There are no such Croats or Bosniacs. In our sample, all Croats and Bos-
niacs who report DPA membership have actually returned. Overall, this model gives some
limited support for the home hypothesis and the social capital hypothesis, but no other.
Finally, Model 3 shows the effects of the attitudinal variables. Neither memories of pre-
war life nor post-war trust of those in the ethnic group is a statistically significant predictor.
As might be expected, fear of loneliness is strongly associated with the desire for commu-
nity return. In contrast to the nationalism hypothesis, people open to intermarriage are also
more likely to want community returns. Surprisingly, post-war family trust is negatively
associated with the desire for community return. Urban pre-war origin and membership
in a DPA remain statistically significant, even after we control for the attitudinal variables.
As in Model 2, ethnic Serbs are less likely to desire community return than Bosniacs, and
this finding remains statistically significant. In addition, after we control for the fear of
loneliness, ethnic Croats are now less likely than the Bosniacs to desire community
return. Additional analysis indicates that ethnic Croats have a slightly higher average
score for fear of loneliness, but the difference is small and statistically insignificant.
The final model has a solid fit of 43%. Overall, these findings support the home hypothesis
and the social capital hypothesis, with a puzzling finding for the effects of post-war family
trust. We find no support at all for the nationalism or security hypotheses.
Discussion
For those who are still displaced, it appears that the home hypothesis may be a significant
factor in wanting to return in a group. A possible explanation is the community appeal of
‘home’, and such a community can be formed during a return together. This community
formation can logically extend to the desire to avoid loneliness during the return
process. For those returning to urban areas, the risk of returning together increases both
visibility and vulnerability. A significant minority return to a city in one communal trip
may spark fears of ethnic conflict and doom returnees to living in an ethnic ghetto, not
their original homes. In contrast, rural areas may face the problem of ‘ghost villages’
where home is nearly impossible to recreate without fellow returnees, encouraging a
group return as the more viable method to recreate both community and economy.
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Membership in a DPA turns out to be significant for the still displaced, with members
more likely to desire a group return. They have greater access to shared resources, both in
networking and in actual amount of support provided. Thus, the social capital hypothesis
has some support.
It is interesting that while all ethnic Croats and Bosniacs who report DPA membership
returned, some ethnic Serbs who are members of a DPA and who strongly desire commu-
nity returns have failed to return. One has to wonder why a DPA membership seems to be
such a powerful facilitator of return for Bosniacs and Croats, but not for Serbs. One poss-
ible factor, already noted in the Context section, is that Bosniac nationalist authorities were
likely to offer support and resources for an organized return, while Serb nationalist auth-
orities were more likely to actively discourage ‘their’ people from returning. That is,
Bosniac nationalists have used return as a way to re-capture territories lost during the
war (Toal & Dahlman, 2011, pp. 167–176). In the same time, Serb nationalists have
focused on ‘right-peopling’ their ethno-territorial regions, that is, on the replacement of
the ethnically cleansed Others with forced migrants from their own ethnic group. Thus,
Serb IDPs have been pressured by ‘their’ nationalists to stay on ‘their’ territories, with
return represented as ‘unpatriotic’ and strongly discouraged (Toal & Dahlman, 2011,
pp. 169, 185; see also Harvey, 2006, pp. 96–97). Therefore, while returning Bosniac
could count on strong and consistent political support of Bosniac nationalist politicians,
Serbs faced hostility and opposition from ‘their’ nationalist politicians.
The security, socio-economic and nationalism hypotheses are generally not supported
among the still displaced, with one exception: in the last model, those who are less natio-
nalistic (in terms of openness to intermarriage) prefer group return. The reasoning may be
that those who are more multicultural (less nationalistic) are more open to returning in a
form that tries to reclaim mixed-ethnic or even multicultural communities.
Turning to returned Bosnians, we find some support for the home hypothesis. Again, we
expect those from urban areas will not need a group return process to find a community
within their old city. Having more interethnic friendships is correlated with a higher desire
for group return. While this finding goes against the nationalism hypothesis, it might be
read as support for the social capital hypothesis, but in a modified form. Conceptualizing com-
munity based on local/regional identity rather than ethnicity would facilitate shared resources
and mutual help in mixed-ethnic group returns. In the case of mono-ethnic returns, interethnic
friendships may assuage fears of returning to an area where another ethnic group is dominant,
as returnees can expect some help from their friends on the ‘other side’.
The security hypothesis is not supported among the returnees, with none of the related
factors being statistically relevant. This suggests that either safety is not a significant issue
for respondents or the group return process is not important in assuaging or heightening
those fears. The socio-economic hypothesis is not supported. In fact, we find the
reverse is true for returned respondents: those with a higher family income are more
likely to prefer group return.
The nationalism hypothesis is not supported in this group either, as only one of the rel-
evant variables—intra-ethnic trust—is found to be salient. Furthermore, those who are less
nationalistic (open to intermarriage and to interethnic friendships) are more likely to desire
group return. One possible explanation is that those who are very nationalistic will never
return to a situation where they are in the minority in number and power, so the question of
the form of the return does not make sense to begin with. Alternatively, those who are less
nationalistic may be more open to re-establishing or creating either a new multicultural
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community, or, at the very least, a non-antagonistic mixed-ethnic community. Thus,
nationalism matters and operates at both the contextual level (in terms of political
pressure) and the individual level (in terms of who will decide to return).
The most surprising finding is that the post-war family trust variable has an opposite
effect for the two different respondent groups. Among those who are still displaced,
those who trust their family more are less likely to desire a group return. Arguably,
those who trust their family more will have resolved their family conflicts about return
and will need less non-family help if and when they return. What is unexpected is that
this factor is also significant for returnees, albeit for the opposite reason; those who
report higher levels of family trust are more likely to have valued and benefited from a
group return. One possible explanation is that the families who experience intense internal
conflict over returning are more likely to still be displaced (as of 2013); in contrast, those
who have already returned may have had a more amenable family dynamic. Several
studies of returnees suggest discussions of return can produce major internal family con-
flicts, mostly along the lines of age and gender.10
Conclusion
While our approach is relatively useful for examining the experiences of Bosnians who are
still internally displaced, it has lower explanatory power for those who have already
returned. Nonetheless, we can safely state that the urban–rural divide and internal
family dynamics play key roles in the Bosnian return process. Those from rural areas
prefer group return, while those from urban centres appear to be uninterested in or even
opposed to it. We expect this is due to the security and well-being concerns of returning
alone to an empty village versus the dynamics of visibly returning en masse to urban
centres. While the coordinated community returns have produced high returns in
several rural areas or small towns in Bosnia—such as Kozarac or Drvar—our findings
suggest this model cannot easily be extended to the larger cities.
It also appears that the return process can divide families, with younger generations
seeing no future in Bosnia, particularly the underdeveloped rural areas, and the older gen-
erations wanting to retire in their homeland. For women and youth, community return
could potentially reproduce patriarchal rural communities, with little opportunity for
them. While it is important to strive to enable those who want to return to exercise that
right, some displaced people might have very good reasons not to desire community
return or return of any kind. The right to return should not be turned into forced return
for those who found a new home elsewhere.
While return in Bosnia has largely ceased, the implications of this study could be relevant
beyond the former Yugoslavia and the Balkans particularly given the recent humanitarian tra-
gedies in Iraq, Ukraine and Syria. By providing new insights into displacement and return,
our article aims to assist the reconceptualization of voluntary return for victims of ethnic
cleansing in post-conflict environments. In a nutshell, the implications are threefold. First,
for humanitarian organizations aiming to assist voluntary return the article creates a demo-
graphic profile of likely returnees, particularly pointing to the more significant obstacles
facing urban returns (a significant finding for Syria’s urban displaced). Second, it demon-
strates the importance of family dynamics and networks in enabling or restricting return.
Third, key actors in peace processes should note the need to mitigate nationalist feelings
could be to support durable returns. By highlighting the negative impact of nationalist
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attachment on return, our article demonstrates the self-destructive role of nationalist elites; by
maintaining negative outgroup feelings, they prevent ingroup members from returning to their
pre-conflict homes even when this is one of their stated objectives as demonstrated, for
instance, in the return ideologies of Bosniacs, Greek Cypriots or Palestinians.
Reconciliation movements linked to the right of return could, in principle, provide alterna-
tive non-violent mechanisms to address radicalization, a significant challenge of broader rel-
evance not only for the Balkans but also across divided societies. Particularly, in the Middle
East the right of return, as stipulated in the relevant UN Pinheiro principles on property res-
titution, could reframe local and international understandings of existing solutions and help
reconcile rival visions of peace and stability. While UN principles provide the legal and nor-
mative boundaries of durable returns, our article opens up a debate as to what is seem as
possible by the displaced persons themselves. The article’s findings, theoretical insights
and survey design could therefore enable future studies to investigate voluntary return inten-
tions, and to identify institutional designs more likely to facilitate sustainable return by iden-
tifying the key priorities, tradeoffs and concerns of victims themselves.
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Notes
1. The most reliable fatality figures on the Bosnian war have been compiled by the Research and Documen-
tation Center (RDC) in Sarajevo. By June 2007, the RDC recorded 97,207 war fatalities and estimated
that the count could rise by a maximum of another 10,000 with ongoing research. The head of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia estimates the number of dead at 110,000. See
Bosnia War Dead Figure Announced, BBC News, 21 June 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/6228152.stm. The current RDC data indicate that 40.82% of the causalities were civilians;
83.33% of the civilian casualties were ethnic Bosniacs (Bosnian Muslims). See RDC, Research
Results and Data Base Evaluation (2007), available at http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/index.htm.
‘Bosniac’ is the self-selected ethnic identifier for the Bosnian Muslim community. UNHCR, Update
on Condition for Return to Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 (January 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.
ba/publications/B&HRET0105.pdf.
2. The internally assisted post-conflict return in Bosnia can be divided into three general phases: the cre-
ation of safe conditions for return; return of property; and property re-construction and returnees’ reinte-
gration (Porobic & Mameledzija, 2014, p. 4). From 1996 to 2000, international assistance equalled at
least 15 billion US$ (Fagen, 2011, p. 4).
3. Minority return refers to displaced persons returning to an area now in the ethno-territorial autonomy
controlled by another ethnic group. Majority return refers to displaced persons returning to an area
now in the ethno-territorial autonomy controlled by their own ethnic group. In this context, ‘minority’
refers not to a local demographic situation, but to membership in the group which does not possess
ethno-political power in the given post-war political entity. Thus, members of an ethnic Serbian
family returning to Drvar after the war are ‘minority returnees.’ Although Serbs were the demographic
majority in Drvar before and are again after the war, Drvar now belongs to a Croat-dominated Canton.
Members of a Bosniac family returning from Germany to Sarajevo after the war are ‘majority returnees’
because Sarajevo is now in a Bosniac-dominated Canton.
4. These numbers are disputed, particularly as to the sustainability of return (i.e. some returnees have
returned to reclaim and then sell their properties). See UNHCR, update on condition for return to
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Bosnia and Herzegovina, supra note 4, at 2; UNHCR, Statistical Summary as at 31 October 2006 (total
number of refugees and displaced persons who returned to/within Bosnia and Herzegovina) (October
2006), available at http://www.unhcr.ba/return/Summary_31102006.pdf (Belloni, 2001; Black, 2001).
Updated numbers can be found at the UNHCR Bosnia website at http://www.unhcr.ba/.
5. By 2014, there were still about 100,400 registered IDPs in Bosnia—people who expressed a wish to
return to the pre-war residence to the authorities and who took steps towards property re-construction
(IDMC 2014, pp. 1, 5).
6. Data was collected by Sarajevo-based Ipsos BH, as a part of the project on The Way Home: Peaceful
Voluntary Return Project (SMU REB: # 12–224).
7. The sampling frame was stratified based on two variables. The first stratification variable was based on
Bosnia’s two entities: Federation and Republika Srpska. The second was based on the coefficient of
return (CR) for each municipality. The CR combined the 1991 pre-war Census data with the 2005 esti-
mates of return (provided by the Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees; see Nenadic et al.,
2005) to express the estimated percent of the pre-war minority population which returned to the given
municipality in the post-war period. The median value of the CR for the Federation was 12.49% and
the median value for the RS was 14.74%. In the Federation, we randomly selected 12 municipalities
where the CR was less than the median and 11 municipalities where it was greater than the median. Simi-
larly, in Republika Srpska, we randomly selected seven municipalities where the CR was less than the
median and five where it was greater than the median.)
8. We did collinearity diagnostics for the models shown in Tables 2 and 3. The highest variance inflation factor
value is 3.57, well below the critical value of 10. Thus, we do not seem to have a multicollinearity problem.
9. Additional statistical analysis indicates that controlling for family income weakens the impact of ethni-
city. Sample evidence suggests major differences in median income by ethnic group of the returnees: 400
KM for Bosniacs/Muslims, 400 KM for Croats, 150 KM for Serbs, and 275 KM for Others.
10. For a number of women, time spent in the West or in urban Bosnian areas can be experienced as gender
liberation from conservative and patriarchal norms and expectations (Parutis, 2014, pp. 167–171). Research
on Bosnian post-war returns to Sarajevo indicates that a major point of contention in the Bosniac commu-
nity is a clash between the returnees and never displaced over the women’s rights values embraced by some
returnees during their time abroad (Stefansson 2004b, p. 64). A study of Moroccan returnees from the Neth-
erlands indicates that young women are generally opposed to return (De Bree, Davids, & De Haas, 2010,
p. 504). A study of 2003–2005 returnees to Afghanistan indicates that women and youth find it extremely
difficult to adapt to the standard of living and social expectations in rural Afghanistan (Harpviken, 2014,
p. 64). Finally, a study of Iranian immigrants to Sweden shows returning to stricter gender roles is a
major deterrent to return for women and families with daughters (Graham & Khosravi, 1997, p. 122).
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Appendix
Table A1. Variable descriptions and expected effects
Variable Description Expected association with the dependent variable
Dependent variable—preference for community return
For still displaced ‘Maybe I would return if other displaced persons from my village/
neighbourhood also returned’ (Scale 0–10, where 0 is insignificant
and 10 is very important; 98—not relevant, 99—DK/NR)
For returnees ‘Which of the following factors influenced your decision to return to
your pre-war home? (Scale 0–10, where 0 is insignificant and 10 is
very important; 98—not relevant, 99—DK/NR).’ Other displaced
persons from my village/neighbourhood returned
Structural variables
Age Self-reported Older people more likely to value community
return.
Pre-war urban residence Self-reported Urban residents less likely to value community
return.
Gender Interviewer-reported Women more likely to value community return.
Education Self-reported (options are: No formal education, Incomplete primary
school, Complete primary school, Incomplete secondary school:
technical/vocational type, Complete secondary school: technical/
vocational type, Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type,
Complete secondary: university-preparatory type, Some university-
level education, without degree, University-level education, with
degree)
Better educated less likely to value community
return.
Ethnicity Self-reported No expectations.
Experiences
Wartime close loss Did anyone close to you lose his/her life during the conflict? (Yes/No) Those who experienced close loss more likely to
value community return.
Wartime abuse Did you personally experience physical injury, imprisonment, or torture
during the conflict? (Yes/No)
Those who experienced wartime abuse more likely
to value community return.
Close interethnic
friendships
‘Out of your closest three friends before the conflict, how many were
not from your ethnic community?’





























Variable Description Expected association with the dependent variable
Membership in DPA ‘Have you been a member of displaced persons association?’ (Yes/No) DPA members more likely to value community
return.
Family income Self-reported Those with higher income less likely to value
community return.
Wartime exile What was/has been your longest residential arrangement while in
displacement?
Those who spent the exile in Bosnia (rather than
abroad) more likely to value community return.
Attitudes
Memories of pre-war life ‘To the extent that you do have memories or representations from life at
your original home, would you say these memories are positive or
negative?’ (Scale 25 to 5, where 25 is very negative and 5 is very
positive, and 0 is neutral, DK ¼ 8, NR ¼ 9)
Those who have more positive memories are more
likely to value community return.
Open to intermarriage Bogardus scale based, average score for the other ethnic groups More nationalistic more likely to value community
return.
Attitudes
Post-war family trust How has your return experience changed your view of others compared
to the times in displacement? I trust my family as before (1-less, 2-
same, 3-more)
Those with higher family trust more likely to value
community returns
Post-war trust of people of
same ethnicity
How did the war change your community’s (family, friends,
neighbours, acquaintances) view of others? People trust members of
their ethnic group (1—less, 2—same, 3—more)
More nationalistic more likely to value community
return.
Fear of loneliness (only
for still displaced)
Which of the following additional factors, if any, would most concern
you about the prospect of returning to your pre-war home? (Scale 0–
10, where 0 is insignificant and 10 is very important; 98—not
relevant, 99—DK/NR) I would feel isolated and lonely
Those more concerned with loneliness more likely
to value community return.
Source: 2013 Bosnia returns data set.
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